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"agency" basis is unfortunate and misleading. In one place he
speaks of this as "imputed agency," which may be technically
correct; but in another place he speaks of it as an "implied
agency," which is clearly wrong. It would conduce to clearness
of thought of both courts and text writers if this liability would
be referred to as what it actually is-namely, one imposed upon
the husband by law and without his consent. To speak of the
wife as in any sense his agent is not only inaccurate but is distinctly confusing because of the very usual situation where
the wife is in fact and law the agent of the husband.
However, with the possible exception of the omission of the
National Reporter citations, these are minor criticisms and do
not seriously impair the usefulness of the book. The scope of
this work is definitely limited to that of a very elementary text
book and there is no adequate discussion of perplexing problems
of the subject such as, for example, the liability of an infant who
has misrepresented his age. But this is not a criticism, as it was
never intended to discuss such problems. The book is and purports to be nothing more than a brief statement of the generally
prevailing rules of law in this subject. On the whole the work
seems to be accurately and carefully done. Within this limited
scope it seems entitled to commendation as a useful piece of work.
ROBERT C. BROWN.
Indiana University School of Law.
Criminal Justice in America. By Roscoe Pound.
Company, New York, 1930. Pp. xiv, 226.

Henry Holt &

Lawyers and judges find a special interest in what Dean
Pound says in this book about criminal law in the United States.
One reason for this interest is the fact that Dean Pound speaks
from an extensive experience as a practicing lawyer and as a
commissioner of appeals of the Supreme Court of Nebraska. His
place in legal education, moreover, is well known; and his work
in crime surveys and as a member of the National Commission on
Law Observance and Enforcement has attracted nation-wide
attention. Another source of professional interest is the fact
that the author is dealing authoritatively with a problem which
is of primary concern to the American judge and lawyer. Furthermore, he centers his discussion of this problem around the
participation by judges and lawyers both in the historical development of the problem and also in meeting its present-day
demands.
The author neither understates nor overstates the problem.
He recognizes fully its actual importance and difficulty. "Criminal law," he declares, "involves the most insistent and most fundamental of social interests." (P. 57.) "Perhaps the most difficult problem of the science of law" (P. 38) is the problem of the
criminal law in its "quest for a workable balance between the
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general security and the individual life" (P. 214) ; for a "balance
between rules of law and magisterial discretion, which will give
effect both to the general security and the individual life, with
the least impairment of either." (P. 38.)
The author refuses, however, to overstate the problem or to
borrow trouble for it. Some common allegations which seek to
magnify the problem are shown to be in fact imaginary and false.
For instance, the author points out the fallacies in the contentions
that disrespect for criminal law is a new or unusual feature in
American life, or that modern lawlessness is caused by the existence of too many criminal laws. American politics and social
traditions and independence of spirit are shown always to have
offered strong opposition to the effectiveness of the criminal law.
The multiplication of the provisions of the criminal law is shown
to have been largely the inescapable result of the growing complexity of American life. In fact, the greatest difficulty in the
whole problem is declared to be the failure of Americans to
amend and to expand their criminal law system to keep pace with
the economic and intellectual progress of the nation.
The author attributes to historical circumstances in England
and in America the emphasis of the common law in protecting
the individual citizen at the expense of the general security.
These historical reasons-such as the colonial fear of the tyranny
of kings and royal judges, and the pioneer conditions of local and
individual self-sufficiency and self-government-are shown to
have been largely displaced by the changed situations and requirements of modern American life. The author concludes,
therefore, that "our whole apparatus of juristic thinking on this
subject must be overhauled." (P. 215.) "We need the same creative spirit and inventive activity which Americans and American lawyers displayed so abundantly in the formative period of
our institutions." (P. 214.)
But no lawyer would expect to do effective, or even safe, work
in this continuous "quest" without having a sound grounding in
the history of the judicial institutions and of the administrative
machinery which he is trying to displace or to improve. Dean
Pound continually presents illuminating details of the historical
origin and development of criminal law and procedure. One
chapter is entitled "Our Inheritance from England." In it, as
elsewhere in the book, he shows how the legal doctrines of Coke
dominated the legal thinking of the 17th century colonists who
came to America; how the doctrines of Blackstone became the
legal principles of the 18th century colonists who won independence from England and who then proceeded to establish the constitutions and laws of their new states; and how the ideas of the
frontiersmen and farmers dominated 19th century American
criminal law.
"Our polity had its roots in the era of the Puritan Revolution. It was established as an independent polity in the era of
the American Revolution. It was formulated in a written Con-
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stitution in the era of the French Revolution. Thus the whole
emphasis is on liberty as contrasted with order, on rights as
contrasted with duties, on checks upon government as contrasted
with efficient government, on the dangers of governmental oppression as contrasted with the menace of anti-social individual
action." (P. 132.)
In each century, therefore, the dominant influence was individualistic and decentralizing. Authority was taken from the
judge and powers were heaped upon the juror. Politics became
of increasingly dominant importance in the administration of
criminal law by short-term, elective officers. In constitutions,
statutes, and administrative practice the people established rigid
checks on criminal investigation, on criminal procedure, and on
penal treatment. While many of these checks are seen to be
necessary and proper today for securing individual rights, it is
made equally clear that there are many others which have outlived their time and which now are only costly and harmful
obstructions.
In evaluating the services, present and prospective, of the
judge and of the lawyer, Dean Pound says: "It cannot be said
too often or too emphatically that the judiciary has, on the whole,
the best record of any of our institutions." (P. 191.) But he
adds, "This is due largely to a tradition [chiefly the common-law
tradition of an independent bench] which has shown signs of
disappearing under the untoward conditions of our urban centers." A common type of judicial weakness is found in the excessive subjection of judges to politics. One result of this condition has been some self-advertising, publicity-hunting judges
whom Dean Pound calls "judicial Barnums." The author refers
also to the similar tendency among some police officers and district attorneys who "go out for glory or publicity," each endeavoring to be spectacular or to "play politics" in his own independent, irresponsible way.
"If the regime of judges appointed for life, which gave us
the great judges who made our law, cannot be restored, we must
learn to use our nominating and electing machinery to ratify a
choice made on non-political lines by those who are competent
to select, and must make tenure secure. Indeed, there are signs
that pressure of the economic order has begun to lead toward
something of this sort in more than one state." (P. 192.)
"Maintenance of the general security in the close-knit economic
order of today, with the new conditions of rapid transportation
and easy movement across political lines, demands organization
of administrative agencies, coordination of responsibility with
power, and reliance upon personality rather than upon a system
of checks and balances. Such things are called for in the twentieth century as emphatically as the conditions of a pioneer,
rural community demanded decentralization, division of power,
independent magistracies, and elaborate checks upon administration. We have become unified economically, and there must be a
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corresponding development in our legal institutions. If we fear
centralization, we must learn to bring about cooperation."
(P. 178.)
In regard to the lawyer, the author points out the responsibility of lawyers both for the evils in the administration of criminal law and also for the improvement of the situation. "A
movement for organization of the profession as a whole has just
begun. . . . Centralized admission under the auspices of the
highest court of the state, is a step in the right direction, taken
in most jurisdictions during the present century. This, however,
is only a small beginning." (P. 194.)
The effect of prohibition legislation upon the administration
of criminal law is not directly discussed. The author refers,
however, to the political theories of popular sovereignty and of
individual liberty which have always been wide-spread among
American citizens as difficult factors in law observance and enforcement.
"Without going into controversial matters of the present, one
need but read the discussions of the era of Rooseveltian progressivism to see that business men have been known to regard
as entirely legitimate evasion of statutes which interfered with
their carrying on business as they chose. We must not overlook
these phenomena when we are considering disrespect for law at
the bottom of the social scale, where it takes cruder, more direct,
and less subtle forms." (P. 64.) "It is significant that openly
expressed contempt for prohibitory laws is most acute among
educated, intelligent persons at the top of the social scale, among
whom the conditions which make for conscious show of selfassertion are most pressing." (P. 172.)
The aim of the program of improvement is stated to be, not
perfect law enforcement, but a reasonably high average of observance and enforcement.
"Our ultimate aim must be a body of laws adequate to securing social interests and capable of that high average. But three
special ends should be kept in view in the endeavor to reach this
ultimate aim under the conditions of the time, namely, preventive justice, a system of individualized treatment of offenders,
and a readjustment of our legally received ideals as to the balance between the general security and the individual life."
(P. 213.)
The author frequently indicates his conviction that lawyers
will continue to have a large part in securing this just balance.
The following passage therefore requires the attention of some
lawyers and of their bar associations:
"As one reads the discussions in the reports of bar associations he can but feel that a chief obstacle to improvement is in
the democratic tradition; in what we must pronounce false ideas
of democracy. Throwing of even the least details of all things
into politics and subjection of every one and everything to political pressure are traditional American ideals. But are they not
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pioneer ideals rather than necessarily democratic ideals? . . .
Distrust of judges, lay magistrates, free rein to counsel in the
forum, extravagant powers of juries, an uneducated, unorganized, deprofessionalized bar are urged as democratic, and their
supposed democratic character is expected to make up for their
manifest inadaptation to the demands of justice today. Every
proposal to make our administration of justice more effective is
resisted eloquently in the name of the common people, or of justice to the poor and oppressed. But these are pioneer institutions, not necessarily democratic institutions. There is no intrinsic reason why democratic institutions should be inefficient.
• . . Moreover, the people at large suffer most from a condition
of ineffective justice. Great enterprises, with highly organized
legal staff, are much better able to secure their interests under
such a system than is the average man. The poor and oppressed
are not better off by being left to the risk of ignorant or unscrupulous practitioners. . . . Demos must learn to govern urban
America by means adapted to its problems. He .cannot expect to
go on governing by means suited only to the pioneer America
which has disappeared." (Pp. 198-200.)
The improvement of criminal justice in the United States in
the past has frequently been blocked by oratory parading as
facts and by fictions, traditions and prejudices masquerading as
legal history. In this book the lawyer and the judge and others
find a compact and forceful marshalling both of facts as established by crime surveys and by personal observation, and also of
principles and rules of law as interpreted and set in their proper
places by authentic legal history. The book therefore deserves
recognition as a sound, useful and stimulating contribution to
the progress of criminal law in twentieth century America.
JAMES J. ROBINSON.
Indiana University School of Law.

